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The Race to the Courthouse: Conflicting
Views Toward the Judicial Review of
OSHA standards*
From the time that Moses directed the Israelites to construct a parapet for their roofs "that thou bring not blood upon
thine house, if any man f d from thence,"' to the present, the
matter of workplace health and safety has occupied a place on
the agenda of civilized societies. However, in the United States
efforts to confront the problem of occupational injuries were
sporadic and largely ineffective until the Occupational Safety
~
is universally considand Health Act2 was e n a ~ t e d .OSHA4
ered a landmark in the history of labor and employee health
legislation. I t was adopted "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working ~onditions."~
In order to fulfill this purpose, the Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to promulgate rules and standards6 with which
each employer must comply.' Despite this massive attempt to
promote the health and safety of employees, OSHA has been
subjected to intense criticism by both protected employees and
regulated employers. Employees argue that the regulations do
* The author wishes to acknowledge Professor Stephen G. Wood for his
encouragement, suggestions, and mentoring. Additional assistance was provided by
Dr. David J. Cherrington, Steve Hill, and various members of the Brigham Young
University Law Review staff. Finally, special thanks go to Kristy Cherrington.
1. Deuteronomy 22:s; cf, Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that OSHA perimeter guarding standard is only applicable to floors and not to roofs).
2. 29 U.S.C. $8 651-678 (1988) (OSHA).
3. The Occupational Safety and Health Act was signed into law on December 29, 1970, and became effective on April 28, 1971.
4. The term "OSHA" has been used to describe the Act, the Agency (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), and the entire occupational safety and
health program. For purposes of this Comment, the term "OSHA" may refer to any
of these meanings with the presumption that the context in which it is used will
c l e the intended meaning.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
6. Id. $ 655.
7 . Id. § 654. Since 1970, OSHA has established numerous rules and standards which appear in several volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).
The regulations primarily are located within Title 29 of the C.F.R.
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not go far enough to adequately protect workers,' while employers maintain OSHA's regulations are so pervasive as to
unduly burden them with excessive and unnecessary regulation.'
Within the enabling legislation of the Act, Congress set
forth both extensive procedural requirements and substantive
criteria which new standards must meet before OSHA may
promulgate a new rule under section 6(b) of the Act.'' These
procedural rules allow for the expression of views by interested
persons and are designed to bring about more reasoned
decisionmaking. However, despite such safeguards, judicial
review by the courts of appeals is afforded to provide a system
of checks and limitations upon the regulating agency."
The regulatory questions of when, how, and to what extent
OSHA may .promulgate standards have been a t issue since
1973.12 Consequently, the Supreme Court and various courts
of appeals have been called upon to issue a long line of opinions
either upholding or vacating the validity of OSHA standards.13 The Supreme Court has substantively established
binding principles on OSHA's rulemaking activity. These guidelines limit the agency's intrusive regulatory authority while
allowing it to Nfill its congressional mandate. These
guidelines also stipulate the burden OSHA must bear in order
for a challenged regulation to be judicially validated. For instance, the Court's decision in Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute, Inc. l4 (Benzene) imposed the re8. See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992) (the AFL-CIO challenged both the procedures and findings OSHA used in determining new standards); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (a public
interest group objected to the delay in the effective date of asbestos standards).
9. See Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 471
(1993).
10. 29 U.S.C. 5 655(b) (1988).
11. According to 29 U.S.C. § 655(f), standards issued by OSHA may be challenged by "any person who may be adversely affected by a standard."
12. The first decision regarding a major OSHA standard was Associated
Industries, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973) (vacating
lavatory standard).
13. See Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.)
(afhming vinyl chloride standard), cert. denied, 421 US. 992 (1975); Synthetic
Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974) (affirming
standard for ethyleneimine) (SOCUA I), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). Contra
Associated Indus., Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973) (vacating lavatory standard); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98
(3d Cir. 1973) (vacating carcinogen emergency temporary standard).
14. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the Benzene case).
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quirement that OSHA may regulate only where it finds a "significant health risk."15 And in American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. u. D~novan'~
(Cotton Dust) the Court defined
the limits of the term "feasibility," prohibiting OSHA's use of
cost-benefit analysis in issuing standards.
Despite these guiding principles from the Supreme Court,
the various courts of appeals have reached divergent and conflicting results in cases where OSHA standards have been
challenged. The uneven pattern suggests that the views of the
courts of appeals regarding their review responsibility and the
application of the Supreme Court's guiding principles are the
cause for the significant divergence of results.
The marked difference in the attitude among some of the
courts of appeals has led some parties challenging standards t o
undertake major efforts to locate the judicial fora most apt t o
be sympathetic to their position." Additionally, conflicting
signals have been sent to OSHA regarding the scope of its
rulemaking authority. As a result of this judicially created
confusion, OSHA, industry leaders, and union representatives
are grasping in the dark for a more definitive view of the judicial review process concerning OSHA regulation^.'^
OSHA standards are more likely to survive judicial scrutiny if the courts of appeals adopt standards which are deferential to the rulemaking authority of OSHA. By abdicating its
responsibility to seriously scrutinize the propriety of rule promulgation to the presumed prudence of OSHA, a court will
rarely, if ever, find a regulation which facially falls outside the
wide scope of OSHA's regulatory authority. Conversely, if a
court compels OSHA to clear all of the hurdles established both
within OSHA, and by the Supreme Court, then only the regulations which are explicitly within the scope of the section
6(b)19 rulemaking authority will survive.20 An example of
15. Id. at 614-15.
16. 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (the Cotton Dust case).
17. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 @.C. Cir. 1977)
(transferring proceedings to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals). The race to the
courthouse becomes even more complex when one or more challenges to the
agency's rule are Ned in multiple jurisdictions. See also American Petroleum Inst.
v. OSHA, 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2025 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 1980).
18. See Rowena M. Duren, Note, The Employer's Dilemma: The Implications
of Occupational Safety and Health in the Arbitral Process-Conflicting Contractual
and Statutory Commands, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV.1067 (1983).
19. 29 U.S.C. 8 655(b) (1988).
20. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0.McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regula-

98

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

each of these positions has been rendered by the courts within
the past eighteen months.
In 1991, the American Dental Association, joined by Home
Health Services and Staffing Association, challenged a rule
promulgated by OSHA2' during that year concerning occupational exposure to bloodborne pathogens.22Despite challenges
to the rule during the adoption process:3 the standards were
enacted. Consequently, suit was brought in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Speaking for the majority, Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner
admitted that, "[the rule] may be unnecessary; it may go too
far; its costs may exceed its benefit^."'^ Despite this, the Seventh Circuit upheld the bloodborne-pathogen rule by adopting
an extremely deferential posture regarding OSHA's ability t o
freely promulgate reg~lations,2~
stating: "So in the main the
rule must be upheld. Which is not to say that it is a good
rule . . . . But our duty as a reviewing court of generalist judges
is merely to patrol the boundary of reasonableness, . . . OSHA's
bloodborne-pathogens rule . . . does not cross it."26
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals exhibited a much
different perspective of judicial review in the case of A n - C I O
v. OSHA.27 In 1989, OSHA issued a set of permissible expo.~~
indussure limits (PELS) for 428 toxic s u b s t a n ~ e sAffected
tries and labor unions challenged the rule, arguing that OSHA

tory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1989).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1991). Bloodborne pathogens are certain diseasecausing microorganisms found in the blood and other body fluids of some individuals which can infect others whose blood or body fluids they enter. The two such
microorganisms of greatest concern are the hepatitis B virus (HBV)and the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The regulations OSHA promulgated are designed to
guard against the transmittal of bloodborne pathogens from patients to health care
workers.
22. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 172 (1993).
23. Martin, 984 F.2d at 824.
24. Id. at 831. See id. at 825-26 for a discussion by Judge Posner concerning
the cost of the regulations compared to the benefit in economic terms. "No doubt
the agency's $813 million estimate is an underestimate." Id. at 826.
25. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HAFW. L.
REV. 505, 510-12 (1985), for a discussion concerning the deference which courts
apply in the absence of substantive review and the infrequency with which such
courts invalidate agency decisions.
26. Martin, 984 F.2d at 831.
27. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
28. 29 C.F.R. 8 1910.1000 (1989).
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had not made sufficiently conclusive findings to justify promulgation of the rule.
The court vacated the standards and remanded to the
agency, stating that the rule "is so flawed that it cannot
stand."29 The court reasoned that OSHA "failed to establish
that existing exposure levels in the workplace present a significant risk of material health impairment or that the new standards eliminate or substantially lessen the risk.'"O Also,
"OSHA ha[d] not met its burden of establishing that [the standards] [were] either economically or technologically fea~ible."~'
The Eleventh Circuit came t o this conclusion because it adopted a "harder look" standard of review rather than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard used by other circuits.32
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the proper role
of judicial review regarding the validity of OSHA regulations.
The cases American Dental Assh v. Martin33and AI?L-CIO v.
OSHA34will be used as vehicles to explore the conflicting rulings being handed down by the various courts of appeals. Ultimately, this Comment will draw conclusions concerning which
formula for review reaps the most jurispmdentidy correct
conclusions.
To lay the necessary groundwork for such a discussion,
Part I1 of this Comment surveys the relevant guiding principles
established by the Supreme Court to review OSHA regulations.
Part I11 then examines the facts and outlines the courts' reasoning in Martin and AF'L-CIO. Next, Part IV analyzes the
holdings in Martin and AF'L-CIO from the perspective of the
relevant requirements discussed in Part II-namely, the standard of review, existence of a significant risk of material health
impairment, and whether the regulations are feasible. Finally,
Part V concludes that the holding in AFL-CIO is preferable to
that of Martin. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, in deciding AFL-CIO, properly adhered to the binding
principles established by the Supreme Court in order t o reach
an economically and socially efficient outcome.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 986.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 982.
I d at 970.
984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993).
965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
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11. GUIDING
PRINCIPLES FOR VALIDATION
OF OSHA STANDARDS

OSHA's authority to issue legally enforceable occupational
safety and health standards is extremely broad. Congress,
when establishing OSHA, made certain of this in the "Findings
and Purpose" section of the Act.35This section supplies policy
guidance concerning the purposes of the OSHA standards,
which emphasize the overriding protective goal of the standards. A cursory review of the OSHA rulemaking authority
may give the impression that, but for some limited procedural
requirements, OSHA retains limitless flexibility and discretion
to decide the stringency, and thus the cost, of its standards.36
However, Congress did not intend, nor has the judiciary been
willing to allow, OSHA to act unchecked.
Despite numerous challenges, OSHA has been largely, but
not uniformly, successful in upholding its standards when challenged in federal courts. For instance, while OSHA suffered a
setback in the Benzene case, the Supreme Court upheld its
regulation in the Cotton Dust case. Through these and other
cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted congressional intent
concerning the appropriate role of the courts when reviewing
challenged OSHA regulations.

A. The Standard of Review
In judicial proceedings reviewing OSHA standards, a critical issue is the scope of the court's authority to review OSHA's
determinations. This is commonly referred t o as the standard

35. In part, this section provides:
(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out
of work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance
to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical
expenses, and disability compensation payments.
(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the
exercise of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and
with foreign nations and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources . . . .
29 U.S.C. 8 651 (1988).
36. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (arguing that Congress has given administrative
agencies unwarranted leeway under regulatory statutes and that Congress must
pass regulatory statutes themselves with more particularity).
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of re vie^.^' The apparent conflict between the various circuits
concerning the appropriate standard of review stems from differing amounts of deference afforded to OSHA by the courts.
Prior t o the enactment of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, courts applied a more searching "substantial evidence" test when decisions were made by regulatory agencies
after administrative adjudications or following completion of a
At the same time, a less strinformal rulemaking pro~ess.~'
gent "arbitrary and capricious" test was employed when reviewing agency rules issued after only an informal rulemaking
pro~eeding.~~
Concerning the standard of review to be employed when
reviewing challenges to OSHA regulations, Congress directed
that "[tlhe determinations of the Secretary [of Labor] shall be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record
considered as a
Despite such seemingly plain language, the various courts of appeals have adopted vastly differing amounts of deference to OSHA standards when employing
the "substantial evidence" standard.
OSHA rulemaking creates a unique situation when determining the appropriate standard of review. OSHA regulations
are promulgated through an essentially informal process similar to the procedures outlined in section 4 of the Administrative
Procedure Act? Given the similarity between OSHA and APA
rulemaking proceedings, the appropriate standard of review
becomes difficult to distinguish. Section 10(e) of the APA42
calls for agency action to be reviewed using the arbitrary and
capricious standard.43The APA directs the judiciary t o apply
37. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 969 (11th Cir. 1992).
38. Administrative Procedure Ad (APA), 5 U.S.C. 8 556(d) (1988). "'Formal'
rulemaking
requires the agency to promulgate a rule on the basis of a record
created through trial-type procedures . . ." STEPHEN G. BREYER,REGULATION
AND
ITS REFORM347 (1982). The procedural requirements to be followed during the
formal rulemaking process are listed in sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. 88 556-557 (1988).
39. 5 U.S.C. $8 553, 706 (1988). "[I]nformal rulemaking . . . requires the
agency only to give notice of a proposed rule and allow comment upon it before
the agency makes up its mind." BREYER,supra note 38, a t 347. See Stephen G.
Wood et al., Regulation, Deregulation, and Re-regulation: An American Perspective,
1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 381, 412, for a discussion of the process of promulgating rules
under the informal rulemaking process.
40. 29 U.S.C. $ 655(f) (1988) (emphasis added).
41. 5 U.S.C. 3 553 (1988). Informal rulemaking is also referred to as notice
and comment rulemaking. BREYER,supra note 38, at 116.
42. 5 U.S.C. 8 706 (1988); Wood et al., supra note 39, at 414.
43. Agency action may be set aside if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

...

.
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the "arbitrary and capricious" standard based upon the nature
of the rulemaking proceeding, while OSHA's enabling legislation clearly mandates "substantial evidence."
This dichotomy caused both the courts and Congress to
question whether the procedural guidelines of the APA were
adequate t o provide sufficient safeguards.44Consequently, another type of rulemaking category was created-hybrid
rulemaking. "Hybrid rulemaking does not describe a single type
of rulemaking proceeding, but includes any rulemaking proceeding that involves more procedure than informal rulemaking
A crucial issue
but less procedure than formal r~lemaking."~~
confronting the courts reviewing the challenged OSHA regulations was whether the proper standard t o be applied was the
one generally applied to informal rulemaking-the arbitrary
-or
the less deferential stanand capricious t e ~ t ~ ~ whether
dard should be applied.
Until recently, review of agency standards was extremely
limited. In early cases, courts afforded agencies great deference
and "upheld their policy choices as long as they were not whol~~
ly i r r a t i ~ n a l . "During
this period, "Ijludges reserved substantive review for instances of adjudication and formal
rulemaking, to which they applied the 'substantial evidence'
standard-a standard purportedly distinct from, and stricter
than, the arbitrary and capricious test applied to informal
rulemaki~~g."~~
By the mid-1970s the hard-look doctrine had become significantO4'Applying this doctrine, courts "appeared to be demanding something more rigorous than mere consideration and
e~planation."~~
They required agencies to promulgate rules
based upon valid policy judgements that could be substantiated
by evidence. This hard-look test served two major purposes.
First was the "requirement that agencies' fmdings of fact have

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. $ 706(2) (1988).
44. See Wood et al., supra note 39, at 412.
45. Id. at 413 (citations omitted).
46. 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A) (1988) (APA dictating the use of the arbitrary and
capricious test for rules resulting from informal proceedings); see Motor Vehicle
Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U S . 29, 41 (1983).
47. Garland, supra note 25, at 532; see Bowman Tramp., Inc. v. ArkansasBest Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 290 (1974) (arbitrary and capricious standard
requires nothing more than a rational basis for the treatment of evidence).
48. Garland, supra note 25, at 532 & 11.147.
49. See id. at 510-11.
50. Id. at 533.
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a basis in the re~ord."~'
This si&ied a new approach to regulation-a presumption against regulation unless the agency
could make a sufficient showing. Second, the hard-look doctrine
"reestablished agency fidelity to congressional intent."52 By
holding agencies accountable for their findings, the courts were
able to see that agencies did not exceed their congressionally
granted powers.
The proper application of this standard within the context
of OSHA regulations was a major issue confronting the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit when called
upon to review standards regulating asbestos hazards in Indus. ~ ~ the court enuncitrial Union Department v. H o d g s ~ n Here,
ated a relatively deferential approach to OSHA's standards designed t o more effectively protect employees. In order to reach
this conclusion, the Hodgson court noted that the legislative
history, notwithstanding the statutory language, supported the
type of review "customarily . . . directed to adjudicatory proceedings or formal rulemaking."54 The court also recognized
that many of the issues confronting OSHA would be on the
"frontiers of scientific knowledge."55 Additionally, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals decided to resolve doubts in favor
of employee health, since "the protection of the health of employees is the overriding concern of OSHA."56Thus, while the
court insisted that its review must be calculated t o prevent
arbitrary and unreasonable standards, a deferential approach
t o OSHA standards was adopted.
This deferential approach has been adopted by several of
the circuits. These courts have defined "substantial evidence"
as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a c~nclusion."~'Under this deferential

51. Id.
52. Id. at 512.
53. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 473 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 474. In American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, the Fifth Circuit resolved
this question by stating that the science-policy regulations which OSHA promulgates require deference from the "nonspecialist, biomedically unsophisticated Article
111 judiciary." Martin, 984 F.2d at 828. For a further discussion of the science-policy questions, see Thomas 0.McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in
EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO.L.J. 729, 731-47 (1979).
56. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 475.
57. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)).
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standard, a reviewing court may not displace an agency's conclusion even if the evidence supports conflicting inferences "so
long as a reasonable person could reach that conclu~ion."~~
Additionally, "[wlhere the agency's policy determinations are
based upon complex scientific and factual data, or involve speculative projections, [the court's] review is particularly deferentiaP9
Proponents of this deferential approach point to statements
from the Supreme Court to support their claim. For example,
the Court has stated that because "[OSHA] places responsibility for determining substantial evidence questions in the courts
of appeals, . . . '[the] Court will intervene only in what ought to
be the rare instance when the [substantial evidence] standard
appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied' by
the court below.'s0 As a result, advocates of OSHA regulations
commonly contend that challengers have failed to show that a
court of appeals misapprehended or grossly misapplied the
standard of review?
This deferential approach is not unanimously applied by
all circuits. First, the burden of proof remains upon OSHA to
justify its standards.62Critics of the deferential approach note
that shifting the burden of proof to the challengers will have
the effect of diluting the standard of review to the point that
the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality become presentB3In such an atmosphere, OSHA would be free to impose
whatever rule it preferred, regardless of the cost, need, or probability of desired result.
Second, there is a fundamental division concerning the
rigors of the "substantial evidence" standard." Under the
"substantial evidence" test, "[courts] must take a 'harder look'

58. National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 866 F.2d 717, 728 (5th Cir. 1989)
(citing Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 976 F.2d 1479, 1485 @.C.
Cir. 1986)).
59. Id. at 729 (citing Forging Indus. Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 773 F.2d
1436, 1443 (4th Cir. 1985)).
60. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 523 (quoting Universal Camera, 340 US. a t
491).
61. See Brief for the Federal Parties at 20, Benzene, 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(Nos. 79-1429, 79-1583).
62. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 653.
63. See Tracy N. Tool, Note, Begging to Defer: OSHA and the Problem of InL. REV. 1336 (1989).
terpretive Authority, 73
64. The "substantial evidence" standard is mandated by Congress within
OSHA's enabling legislation. See 29 U.S.C. 5 655(f) (1988).

m.
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at OSHA's action than [they] would if [they] were reviewing the
action under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard applicable to agencies governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act.'@' The substantial evidence test requires
OSHA "to identify relevant factual evidence, to explain the
logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to state
candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present its
reasons for rejecting significant contrary evidence and argument.'@6However, the agency cannot rely on the notice and
comment nature of the informal rulemaking procedure to stack
the deck in its favor by presenting only favorable conclusions.
The Eleventh Circuit noted, "Considering the record 'as a
whole' further requires that reviewing courts 'take into account
not just evidence that supports the agency's decision, but also
countervailing evidence.' ""
This rendition of the "substantial evidencelhard-look" test
provides for more rigorous scrutiny than the deferential approach taken by some circuits. Nevertheless, Congress delegated unusually broad discretionary authority to establish standards necessary to protect employee^.^' Proponents of the
hard-look approach argue that the proper standard of review is
for reviewing courts to "provide a careful check on the agency's
determinations without substituting its judgement for that of
the agency. . . [and] t o ensure that the regulations resulted
from a process of reasoned decisionmaking consistent with the
agency's mandate fkom Congress.'@gIn the alternative, under
the traditional arbitrary and capricious standard, OSHA is able
to promulgate standards although the new rules are based
65. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added)
(quoting Asbestos Info. Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1984)).
66. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); see also Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
B r e ~ a n 503
,
F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
67. AFL-CIO,965 F.2d at 970 (quoting AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636,
649 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
68. See 29 U.S.C. # 651(b) (1988).
69. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649-50 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
By requiring not only that the agency set forth a rationale consistent
with the statutory purpose and outline available alternatives, but also
that the agency support its h d i n g s of fact with record evidence and
choose a final outcome that is reasonable in light of the facts, alternatives, and statutory purpose, a court can substantially decrease the odds
that an agency decision motivated by improper purposes will escape invalidation.
Garland, supra note 25, at 557.
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upon improper motives and do not exhibit fidelity to the Agency's Congressional mandate." Although OSHA was empowered with broad rulemaking authority, neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court recognizes the Agency's ability to make unchecked findings. Congress placed the responsibility to guard
against discretionary excesses by OSHA squarely upon the
courts of appeals."
B. Existence of a Significant Risk of
Material Health Impairment
OSHA defines the occupational health and'safety standard
as "a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or
use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe
or healthful employment and places of empl~yment."'~To justify issuing a standard, "OSHA [must] make a threshold finding that a significant risk of material health impairment exi s t ~ " ?to~employees and that the new standard is "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" to eliminate or substantially reduce
that risk.74Therefore, OSHA is not entitled to arbitrarily regulate any risk; rather, only those which present a "significant
risk of material health impairment."75
In the Benzene case, a sharply divided Supreme Court
vacated OSHA benzene standardd6 In this plurality decision,
the Court set forth some guiding principles to be used when
determining what health impairments are material and what
constitutes a significant risk. The Court held that assuming the
existence of risk, based merely upon an OSHA finding,
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from OSHA to the

70. 'When a court declines to scrutinize (or even assumes the existence of)
supporting facts, ignores the presence of alternatives, and requires nothing more
than a minimally rational explanation, almost any outcome can pass muster-even
if it springs from an unstated, inappropriate motive." Garland, supra note 25, at
556.
71. 29 U.S.C. 8 655(f) (1988).
72. Id 8 652(8) (emphasis added).
73. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 972 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Benzene,
448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980); Cotton Dust, 452 U.S.490, 505-06 (1981)).
74. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 973 (citing Benzene, 448 U.S.at 615).
75. Id. (citing Benzene, 448 U.S. at 64142). See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 64142,
for a discussion of the difference between "safe" and "risk-free."
76. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 607-08. Although five different opinions were handed
down, a majority of five Court members voted to vacate the standard.
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industry.77 More appropriately, OSHA ultimately bears the
burden to prove by substantial evidence that such a risk truly
exists and that the proposed standard is necessary.78
Next, the Agency was required t o show, by substantial
evidence, that it was at least more likely than not that the new
standards would eliminate o r reduce a significant risk in the
workplace.7gThe Court also refused t o allow OSHA to set the
same limit for all industries, "largely as a matter of administrative convenience," unless the Agency was able to make the
requisite showing of sigdicant risk?' Here, the Court relied
on the exemption of gasoline station employees from the requirements of the standard despite the fact that they were
exposed t o the inhalation of gasoline vapors." OSHA's position concerning establishment of a single standard for an entire
industry was inconsistent because there were other industries
in which lower levels would have been feasibleOs2
Thus, in the
Court's view, OSHA's concessions to practicality undermined its
arguments favoring highly protective standards.
Finally, the plurality ruled that the substance must pose a
risk which could be "quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in an understandable
However, the plurality made it clear that although a
finding of significant risk was required, it did not intend to
remove OSHA's ability to regulate hazardous substances. In
other words, the Court will not require the Agency to "wait for
deaths t o occur" before taking any action.84First, the plurality
said the significant risk requirement is not a "mathematical
~traightjacket;"~~
rather the determination that a particular
level of risk is significant can be "based largely on policy consideration~."~Second, the Court conceded that OSHA need
not support its findings "with anything approaching scientific

77. See id. at 653.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 639-46.
80. Id. at 650. Although OSHA may determine that a significant risk of harm
exists in one industry, that determination is not sufficient to apply protective regulations to all industries in the interests of administrative convenience until a sigd k a n t risk is shown to exist in each industry.
81. Id. at 628.
82. Id. at 650.
83. Id. at 646.
84. Id. at 656 n.63.
85. Id. at 655.
86. Id. at 656 11.62.
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certainty," but that it could utilize "conservative assumptions"
in interpreting data?' In applying the Court's direction, the
Eleventh Circuit wrote, "!l'he lesson of Benzene is clearly that
OSHA may use assumptions, but only to the extent that those
assumptions have some basis in reputable scientific evithe Supreme Court granted OSHA leeway
d e n ~ e . "Although
~~
in making its findings, it did not remove the core requirements
imposed upon the agency by Congress. Hence, "OSHA is not
entitled to take short-cuts with statutory requirernent~."~~
In this way, the Supreme Court gave OSHA considerable
flexibility in performing risk assessments and determining that
a risk was signifkant; however, i t was clear the Court would
not permit OSHA to avoid the process entirely by relying on
mere policy in order to bypass the restrictive guiding principles.

C. Feasibility
Once OSHA determines that a toxic substance creates a
s i m c a n t risk of material health impairment, it is still not
free to promulgate any standard. Whatever regulation OSHA
promulgates must comply with the requirements of section
6(b)(5) of OSHA. In part, section 6(b)(5) provides: "The Secretary . . . shall set the standard which most adequately assures,
to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health or functional capa~ity."~Courts have interpreted this
to mean that "section 6(bX5) mandates that the standard
adopted 'prevent material impairment of health to the extent
feasible.'
An OSHA standard must be feasible in the sense that most
employers will be able, both technologically and economically,
. ~standard
~
is technologicalto comply with its r e q ~ i r e m e n t s A

87. Id. at 656; see Victor B. Flatt, OSHA Regulation of low-Exposure Carcinogens.. A New Approach to Judicial Analysis of Scientifu: Evidence, 14 U. PUGm
SOUND L. REV.283 (1991).
88. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 979 (11th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 975.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988) (emphasis added).
91. AFLCIO, 965 F.2d at 973 (quoting Cotton Dust, 452 U S . 490, 512
(1981)).
92. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 508-09, 513 11.31; American Iron & Steel Inst. v.
OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

.
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ly feasible if the means of compliance are either already in use
or will be available within the standard's deadlines.93
The issue of technological feasibility is generally resolved
by an OSHA showing "that modern technology has at least
conceived some industrial strategies . . . which the industries
are generally capable of adopting.'*4 However, the issues surrounding economic feasibility are much less settled.95
A standard is economically feasible if the costs it imposes
do not "threaten 'massive dislocation' to, or imperil the existence of, the ind~stry."~'The Third Circuit used the phrase
"massive economic dislocation" to describe the extent of economic impact which OSHA would need to fmd before determining that a regulation is not economically feasible." Similarly,
the D.C. Circuit referred to a standard which would make "financial viability generally impos~ible.'*~
The Supreme Court
accepted the view that a standard is economically feasible if it
will allow the industry to maintain 'long-term profitability and
competitiveness.~'g9Although these definitions are generally
accepted, their applications remain a source of contention. The
friction concerns whether OSHA should or may use a cost-benefit analysis and, in the absence of such analysis, whether
OSHA must alternatively adopt the most cost-effective alternative.
The issue of economic feasibility was presented to the Supreme Court in Benzene. The lower court had ruled that OSHA
must show that the "measurable benefits" expected by the
standard bear a "reasonable relationship" t o the costs imposed@
'. '
Although the Fifth Circuit had said that no formal

93. See Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 508-09.
94. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
95. See Howard A. Latin, The Feasibility of Occupational Health Standurds:
An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 583
(1983).
96. Marshall, 647 F.2d at 1265 (citations omitted) (quoting AFL-CIO v.
B r e ~ a n ,530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975)) (an industry's ability to pass on costs
becomes relevant to this inquiry if it cannot absorb the costs without massive
dislocation).
97. Brennan, 530 F.2d at 123.
98. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
99. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n.55. (1981) (quoting Brief of Federal
Respondent at 49, Cotton Dust (Nos. 79-1429, 79-1583)).
100. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 501-05 (5th Cir. 1978),
af'd sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980) (the Benzene case).
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cost-benefit analysis was required, and that a rough, but educated, benefit analysis was sufficient, OSHA argued that any
cost-benefit technique places an "economic value (implicit or explicit) on life, health, bereavement pain, and suffering, and
other consequences of occupational disease and death."lO' The
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to rule whether OSHA
must balance costs and benefits because they were able t o
vacate the benzene standards on significant risk grounds.102
The issue of economic feasibility was revisited in Cotton
Dust. The Supreme Court held that OSHA does not require
cost-benefit analysis.103The CO& did not expressly rule that
the cost-benefit analysis is precluded. However, the statement
in the opinion that cost-benefit was inconsistent with the language, legislative history, and policies of the Act was a strong
indication that the Court believes cost-benefit analysis is prohibited? OSHA has since interpreted the decision as precluding cost-benefit analysis.lo5
Although the Supreme Court removed all wind from the
sails of cost-benefit analysis, it did so only in the area of standards regulating toxic substances or h d u l physical agents.
The Court did not preclude use of cost-benefit analysis by
OSHA in priority setting or in other regulatory actions apart
from section 6(b)(5).lW Although the Cotton Dust opinion
sounded the death knell for cost-benefit analysis, the Court did
indicate that the practical impact of using cost-benefit analysis
would be to force OSHA "to choose the less stringent point" in
setting standards than would be set if OSHA were left to its
own feasibility approach.lO' Hence, the tool of cost-benefit
analysis, although likely to promote efficient and sufficiently
protective regulations, has been removed from the arsenal of
both the courts and regulation challengers.
The issue of cost-benefit analysis, although determined by
the Supreme Court, still elicits strong expressions from both

101. Brief for Federal Parties at 62 11.52, Benzene, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Nos.
78-911, 78-1036).
102. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 639-40.
103. See Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 512-13.
104. See rd. at 490-92.
105. Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 19, American Dental
Ass'n v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993) (No. 93-7).
106. Cotton Dust, 452 US. at 509 11.29(expressing no opinion on the use of
cost-benefit analysis to other provisions of the Act).
107. Id. at 513.
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proponents and opponents of its use. Supporters argue that its
economic tools can be most useful t o a rational policymaker.'08 Opponents claim that it obliterates moral values.'0g
Although the practical effect of the decision was the elimination of cost-benefit analysis as a tool of judicial review, the
doctrine of cost effectiveness was not ab~lished.''~Cost-benefit analysis determines whether the social benefits of the regulation outweigh the costs to the industry of imposing it and,
therefore, whether standards ought to be imposed a t all. On
the other hand, cost effectiveness merely compels the choice of
a less costly alternative in the case where there are multiple
methods of effectively reducing the significant risk.
OSHA accepted the doctrine of cost effectiveness, saying
that "the statute permits the Secretary t o select the least expensive means of compliance that will provide an adequate
level of protection.""' The Supreme Court went even further,
saying that the possibility existed that OSHA might be required to choose a one-respirator standard rather than a fiverespirator standard, if the same level of protection could be
reached using both policies.'12 Thus, it is reasonable to expect
OSHA to adopt the most cost-effective pro~edure.''~

108. See Bruce D. Fisher, Controlling Government Regulation: Cost-Benefit
Analysis Before and After the Cotton Dust Case, 36 ADMIN.L. REV. 179 (1984).
109. See Michael S. Baram, Cost Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for
Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGYL.Q. 473,'
502-15 (1980); Barry Roberts & Regina Kossek, Implementation of Economic Impact
Analysis: The Lessons of OSHA, 83 W . VA. L. REV. 449 (1981).
110. Executive Order No. 12,291 was issued "to reduce the burdens of existing
and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and
codict of regulations, and insure well reasoned regulations." 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
The executive order further provides that regulatory action should not be taken
unless the "potential benefits to society outweigh the potential costs." Id. a t 128;
see infia note 112 (supporting the contention that in promulgating rules, the Secretary is to select the least expensive alternative which will provide an adequate
level of protection).
111. Brief for Federal Respondent at 56, Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)
(Nos. 79-1429, 79-1583).
112. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 514 11.32 (1981) (explaining that the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" limitation in section 3(g) might compel OSHA to
implement the one-respirator standard rather than the five-respirator standard).
113. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 833 (7th Cir.) (Coffey, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993).
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111. AMERICAN
DENTALASS'NV. MART^
AND AFL-CIO V. OSHA

A. The Facts: American Dental Ass'n v. Martin
On December 6, 1991, OSHA promulgated a rule on occupational exposure to bloodborne pathogens.'" The rule was
designed to protect health care workers from viruses, particularly the hepatitis B (HBV) and the AIDS-causing human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV). Three employer groups challenged the rule: dentists, medical personnel firms, and home
health care providers. 'I5
The OSHA rule adopted the philosophy of "universal precautions," which means safeguards are taken against the blood
of every individual rather than just the blood of patients known
or believed to be likely carriers of HBV or HIV. The regulations
included engineering controls,116 work practice contro1s,'"
requirements for personal protective equipment,'" housekeeping req~irements,"~reporting requirements,120 and if
warranted, provisions for medical care.121
A person infected with HBV has a one in three chance of
contracting acute hepatitis, a serious and sometimes fatal liver
disease. "Although most infected persons recover uneventfully,
about one percent die and about six to ten percent of adult . . .
victims of Hepatitis I3 become carriers."lB A vaccination exists for HBV which is effective for eighty-five to ninety-seven
HBV can be
percent of persons to whom it is admini~tered.'~
transmitted through blood-to-blood contact or through the virus
contact with mucous membranes in the eyes, nose, or mouth.
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) calculated that over a
forty-five year working lifetime, 83 to 113 of every 1000 nonimmune health care workers would suffer an HBV infection,
from which two or three would die." The court relied upon
114. 29 C.F.R. 8 1910.1030 (1991).
115. Martin, 984 F.2d at 824.
116. 29 C.F.R. 8 1910.1030(d)(2Xviii) (1991).
117. Id. 5 1910.1030(dX2Xvi).
118. Id. 8 1910.103O(dX3Xi).
119. Id. 8 19lO.l03O(dX4).
120. Id. 8 1910.1030(f)(1).
121. Id. 3 1910.1030(fX3).
122. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993).
123. Id.
124. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,028-29, 64,028-35 (1991).
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statistics which indicate that patient-communicated hepatitis B
kills approximately two hundred health workers in the United
States annually.'*
Infection with HIV leads to acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS), a disease which to date has proven fatal.
HIV can also be spread through blood-to-blood contact. It commonly occurs through needlesticks or when contaminated blood
comes in contact with non-intact s k i d z 6HIV is not as easily
transmitted as HBV due to HWs inability to remain viable
outside of the body. Consequently, "as of 1991, there had been
only 24 confirmed cases of U.S. health care workers infected
with the AIDS virus."127
In promulgating the standard, OSHA determined that
bloodborne pathogens posed a significant risk of material
health impairment to employees and that the standard was
reasonably necessary and appropriate to eliminate or substantially reduce that risk. OSHA further determined that its assessment of significant risk justified imposition of the standard
based on occupational exposure to blood. This determination
disregarded the worker's particular occupational o r workplace
setting. OSHA also discussed alternative standards. In particular, it rejected a mandatory HBV program determining that a
significant risk of HBV remained even with a universal vaccine
and that "the hepatitis B vaccine will not protect employees
from other bloodborne pathogens such as HIV."'"
Pursuant to section 6(f) of OSHA,'% the American Dental
Association (ADA) sought review of OSHA's standards in the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The dental association contended that OSHA failed to consider each sector of the health
care industry separately, thereby finding a significant risk of
material health impairment in all health care occupations due
to their failure to disaggregate the i n d ~ s t r y . 'Although
~
the
ADA conceded that a significant risk of infection existed in
some health care procedures, they contended the risk was not
sufficiently significant to warrant its application to dental
health care setting^.'^' Additionally, the ADA charged that
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Martin, 984 F.2d at 824.
56 Fed. Reg. 64,016-17 (1991).
Martin, 984 F.2d at 824.
56 Fed. Reg. 64,037 (1991).
29 U.S.C. 8 655(f) (1988).
Martin, 984 F.2d at 826.
Id. at 826.
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the standards imposed enormous economic costs on the dental
health care profession at a time of major reforms to control the
rising cost of health care.'" On January 28, 1993, a 2-1 opinion was issued rejecting ADA's challenge.lm

B. The Martin Court's Reasoning
Initially, the majority dealt with the American Dental
Association's objection that OSHA failed to disaggregate the
health industry into various sectords4 The court acknowledged OSHA's failure to assess the potential risk to
workers on an industry-by-industry basis.'" However, the
court did note that OSHA "gave separate consideration to every
point raised before it by the dental association. It pointed out
that the saliva of dental patients frequently contains blood . . .
and that it is possible, though far from certain, that even a
small quantity of blood . . . can sometimes be infective."lSB
Thus, the court exhibited deference enabling OSHA to adopt
whatever regulations it believed necessary and allowed them to
recognize a risk of bloodborne pathogens within the medical
industry as a whole.13'
In promulgating the rule, OSHA treated all sectors of the
health care industry as if each were part of one generic whole.
'What OSHA did not do was attempt t o disaggregate the risk
industry by industry."ls8 Although it computed the costs each
sector would bear to determine whether the economic feasibility rule would proscribe imposition of the standard in that sector, "it did not attempt t o determine separately the risk of HIV
or HBV infection in dentistry, in home-health services, in thoracic surgery, in ophthalmology, and so forth."lsg
The court warned that "OSHA cannot impose onerous
requirements on an industry that does not pose substantial
hazards t o the safety or health of its workers merely because
the industry is a part of some larger sector or group-

132. See id. at 838 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 823.
134. Id. at 826-27.
135. "What OSHA did not do was attempt to disaggregate the risk industry by
industry." Id. at 827.
136. Id. at 826-27.
137. "It is not our business to pick the happy medium between these extremes.
It is OSHA's business." Id. at 827.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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ing . . . ."140 However, it recognized that requiring the agency
to "proceed workplace by workplace" would result in regulatory
inefficiency and require "hundreds of thousands of separate
rules."141 Given this choice, the court again adopted a deferential approach, stating: "It is not our business to pick the happy medium between these extremes. It is OSHA's business. If it
provides a rational explanation for its choice, we are
bound."142Therefore, by abdicating the responsibility of selecting a happy medium, the court allowed OSHA t o adopt a
nonsensical extreme.
Next, the opinion considered whether bloodborne pathogens pose a significant risk of material health impairment to
health care workers and whether the regulations are reasonably necessary or appropriate t o eliminate or substantially
reduce that risk. Here, the court supplied the greatest example
of judicial abdication of its reviewing role t o the "better judgment" of a regulatory agency.
On this point, the court stated: "OSHA's evaluation of the
effects of the rule, relying as it does on the undoubted expertise
of the Centers for Disease Control, cannot seriously be faulted,
at least by judges. Hence we cannot say that the rule . . . flunks
the test of material reduction of a significant risk t o workplace
health."143Furthermore, the court ruled that if requirements,
"whether wise or not, are within the broad bounds-of the reasonable," then they should be "entitled t o respect by the nonspecialist, biomedically unsophisticated Article I11 judiciary*"lM
Finally, the court dealt with objections that the rule did
not satisfy the feasibility requirement. The majority opinion
acknowledged significant errors by OSHA with respect to the
costs and benefits realized because of the final rule.145Regarding the standard of economic feasibility, the court employed a deferential approach, stating:

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 828.
145. Id. at 826 (the majority expressed skepticism concerning the accuracy of
OSHA's projected costs to the dental industry ($813 million estimate is an underestimate) and projected valuation of lives saved by the regulations ($4 million per
life is also an underestimate)).
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OSHA did not (indeed is not authorized to) compare the
benefits with the costs and impose the restrictions on finding
that the former exceeded the latter. Instead it asked whether
the restrictions would materially reduce a ,significant
workplace risk to human health without imperiling the existence of, or threatening massive dislocation to, the health care
industry. For this is the applicable legal standard.146

Although the rule adopted by the majority t o not require the
regulations t o pass a cost-benefit analysis is consistent with the
Supreme Court opinion in Cotton Dust, the majority failed to
discuss the cost-effectiveness of the reg~1ation.l~~
The majority conceded that the final rule "may be unnecessary; it may go too far; its costs may exceed its benefits."'"
Yet, the majority disregarded those errors and upheld the rule,
concluding that a reviewing court merely patrols the boundary
of reasonableness and that the bloodborne-pathogen rule "does
not cross it."14'
C. The Facts: AFL-CIO v. OSHA
On January 19, 1989, OSHA issued a new set of Air Contaminants Standards15' t o update previously existing standards pursuant to section 6(b) of OSHA.lS1This revised standard pertained to the permissible exposure 'levels (PELs) for
428 different toxic substances. Specifically, the standards lowered the PELs for 212 substances, set new standards for 164
newly regulated substances, and left 52 other substances unchanged.152
Challengers t o the standards contended that "OSHA's use
of generic findings, the lumping together of so many substances
146. Id. at 825 (citing 29 U.S.C. Q 655 03x5) (1988); Benzene, 448 U.S. 607,
642-45, 655-56 (1980); Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 509-12, 530-36 (1981)).
147. "The most cost effective and costefficient regulation would be to require
HBV vaccinations for all health care workers a t risk of exposure in the United
States, and to enforce existing state regulations." Id. at 847 (Coffey, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Certainly HBV vaccinations for all health care
workers would be less expensive than the $813 million imposed upon the dental
industry by the existing regulations.
148. Id. at 831.
149. Id.
150. 54 Fed. Reg. 2332-2983 (1989) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. Q 1910).
151. 29 U.S.C. Q 65503) (1988).
152. AF'L-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 969 (11th Cir. 1992). "Permissible exposure limits (PELs)reflect the maximum amount of contaminants in air to which
workers may be exposed over a given time period." H. at 968 n.4.

.
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in one rulemaking, and the short time provided for comment . . . combine to create a record inadequate to. support this
massive new set of PELs."lSS On July 7, 1992, a unanimous
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the standards and
remanded them to the agency.'54

D. The Reasoning in AFL-CIO v. OSHA
The court in AFL-CIO employed a careful analysis of each
hurdle set up by the Supreme Court and carefully specified
where and how OSHA's findings failed to clear the required
obstacles. Regarding the standard of review, the court noted its
statutorily defined responsibility to only uphold OSHA findings
if they were "supported by substantial evidence in the record
considered as a whole."'55 Hence, the court rejected taking a
deferential approach stating it "must take a 'harder look' at
OSHA's action than [it] would if [it] were reviewing the action
under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.n156
The court rejected the procedures used by OSHA to create
the rules as "generic r~lemaking."'~'The challenged standards dealt with 428 different substances affecting twentyseven different industries. While the court ruled that "nothing . . . prevent[ed] OSHA from addressing multiple substances
in a single rulemaking,"'" this did not allow the court to ignore the requirements of the Act. The rule enunciated by the
court requires OSHA to find that the significant risk of material health impairment exists for each and every regulated substance individually to be upheld. '"
The agency's determination of the extent of risk imposed
by the individual substances was problematic. The court found
that "OSHA has a responsibility to quantify or explain, at least
to some reasonable degree, the risk posed by each toxic sub-

153. Id. at 971.
154. Id. at 962.
155. Id. at 969-70 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. 8 655(f) (1988)).
156. Id. at 970 (quoting Asbestos Info. A s h v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
157. Id. at 971 (emphasis omitted).
158. Id. at 972.
159. "W]e believe the PEL for each substance must be able to stand independently, i.e., that each PEL must be supported by substantial evidence in the record
considered as a whole and accompanied by adequate explanation." Id.

.

118

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW FEVIEW [I994

"[Hlowever, OSHA made no attempt to estimate
the risk."lel Rather, OSHA took short cuts and "merely provided a conclusory statement that the new PEL will reduce the
'significant' risk of material health effects shown t o be caused
by that substance, without any explanation of how the agency
determined that the risk was signifi~ant."'~~
Finally, the court considered whether the new standards
satisfied the feasibility requirement. Again, the court demanded that OSHA satisfy its requirements. The opinion stated that
"[dlespite OSHA's repeated claims that it made feasibility determinations on an industry-by-industry basis, it is clear that
The "general
the agency again proceeded 'generi~ally.'"'~~
presumption of feasibility" afforded to OSHA "does not grant a
license t o make excessively broad generalities as t o feasibility."lgp OSHA failed to demonstrate economic feasibility for
each affected industry.lBS

IV. ANALYSISOF MARTINAND AFL-CIO UNDERTHE
MICROSCOPE
OF ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES

A. The Standard of Review
By adopting the deferential role of patrol guards at the
border of reasonabilitylBpin the review process, the majority
in Martin not only disregarded guiding principles established
by the Supreme Court, but also sent dangerous signals t o
OSHA concerning its regulatory powers. If the position of the
Martin majority were to be universally adopted, OSHA would
be free to impose regulations without meaningful limit, extending to the nonsensical limit where no reasonable mind could
uphold the rule without fear of judicial invalidation.le7
On the other hand, the AFL-CIO court faithfully discharged its duty t o require OSHA t o justify its conclusion
through a showing of substantial evidence. By so doing, the
Eleventh Circuit created an atmosphere in which the regulato-

160. Id. at 975 (emphasis omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 980.
164. Id. at 981-82.
165. See id. at 982.
166. See American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993).
167. See Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981).
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ry agency was not given free range to act as legislature, executive, and judiciary without making an accounting for that authority. Rather, by adopting the hard-look approach, the court
allowed OSHA the requisite autonomy t o Nfill its intended
purpose, while reserving a critical check on potentially unbridled power.
On balance, the AFL-CIO court employed the more correct
reviewing standard. The Martin court failed because it did not
take a "harder look" as suggested by the Fifth1" and Eleventh Circuits. Moreover, because it did not require OSHA to
support its conclusions by substantial evidence, the court merely deferred to the expertise of the agency and opted for "administrative convenience."16gA proper review requires the court
to consider both the evidence supporting the agency's regulations as well as evidence calling for judicial invalidation. "Furthermore, 'the validity of an agency's determination must be
judged on the basis of the agency's stated reasons for making
that determinati~n.'""~
Judge Posner neither questioned OSHA's motives nor did
he seriously consider the merits of the dentists' contentions
that the regulations were unnecessary and harmful. Judge
Coffey, in his dissent, charged that "[tlhe rule was drafted
partially in response to the public hysteria surrounding AIDS
created by the media's failure to balance their reporting with
scientific data on t r a n s m i s s i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~
The result of a judgment in which the court fails to probe
the record t o find evidence supporting OSHA's determinations
establishes a high water mark for deference to an agency that
does not do its job. Courts must remember that the burden of
proof is upon the agency. By failing to perform their reviewing
role, courts indicate that they will allow OSHA to continue to
impose excessive regulatory burdens on industry in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The purposes of the congressionally created procedural safeguards, whereby OSHA can be

168. Asbestos Info. Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1984).
169. Martin, 984 F.2d at 836 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing International Union, United Automobile Workers v. OSHA, 938 F.2d
1310, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
170. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Benzene,
448 US. 607, 631 n.31 (1980)).
171. Martin, 984 F.2d at 831 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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held accountable and responsible for the results of its actions
are frustrated when courts do not take a hard-look approach.

B. Existence of a Significant Risk of
Material Health Impairment
The greatest error reached first by OSHA and then by the
Martin court was a determination that a significant risk of
material health impairment exists in the dental health care
industry.172The applicable legal standard in this area is that
OSHA has the burden of proving that there currently exists a
"significant risk of material health impairment" to employees
and that the new standard is "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to eliminate or substantially reduce that risk.173
In order to reach the results necessary to justify regulation, OSHA engaged in faulty analysis and misrepresentation
of actual risk.lV4Little doubt exists concerning the existence
of significant risk if the entire health care community is viewed
as a whole. Figures supplied by OSHA and relied upon by the
majority show that in addition to the twenty-four confirmed
cases of AIDS, Hepatitis B kills approximately 200 health care
However, these figures are reached only
workers ann~al1y.l~~
when twenty-four health care industry sectors are aggregated
together.
A valid finding of significant risk could have been reached
if OSHA had disaggregated each identifiable sector. In his
dissenting opinion, Judge Coffey postulated, "Apparently OSHA
realized it was unable to establish a significant risk in the
appellants' respective fields andlor for the sake of convenience

172. "OSHA's fatal error, in my opinion, occurred when it failed to recognize
and consider the varying risk of occupational exposure in the respective appellants'
professions." Id. at 839 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 615, 653; Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 506 (1981).
174. "OSHA made a hodgepodge of findings . . . resulting in nothing but a
generalized determination of significant risk . . . ." Martin, 984 F.2d at 833
(Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. Id. at 824.
176. The twenty-four industry sectors include: offices of physicians (including
ambulatory medical services), dental offices, hospitals, medical-id dental laborag
ries, nursing homes, residential care facilities, dialysis centers, drug treatment
centers, home health care, hospices, government outpatient facilities, blood collection and processing, health clinics in industrial facilities, personnel services, funeral
homes and crematories, research laboratories, linen services, medical and dental
equipment repair, law enforcement, fwe and rescue, correctional institutions,
schools, lifesaving, and regulated waste removal. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,041 (1991).
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chose to combine the risk present in the entire health care
area."'" Had OSHA disaggregated the various sectors, it
would have been unable to regulate the dental profession. Only
one individual out of the twenty-five HIV cases relied upon by
OSHA to constitute sigmfkant risk was employed in the dental
professi~n.'~~
Certainly a single incident is certainly not sufficient to constitute significant risk. Similarly, OSHA failed t o
determine the number of HBV cases among the respective sectors. Rather, OSHA relied on CDC estimates that 8700 cases
occur annually throughout the health care industry.'79
Failing t o disaggregate a sector of a larger industry is not
consistent with prior OSHA practice^.'^^ Criticizing the
majority's treatment of this issue, Coffey noted, "[Tlhere are no
obvious barriers t o disaggregation here. In fact, OSHA has in
past years promulgated a wide variety of industry and
equipment-specific lockout standard^."^^' OSHA did not satisfy its requirement to show that dental health care workers are
exposed to a risk which can be categorized as significant.
The Seventh Circuit's error is magnified when compared
with the treatment given to generic rulemaking by the Eleventh Circuit. That court correctly required OSHA to be very
specific, at least to some reasonable degree, in quantifying the
extent of the risk each substance posed to workers. The AFLCIO court refused to close its eyes and respect repetitions of
OSHA boilerplate findings that the new limit would protect
workers from significant risk of some material health impairment. lS2
Had the analysis in AFL-CIO been applied to the dental
association's argument that the dental health care sector had
not been disaggregated, the bloodborne-pathogens rule would
177. Martin, 984 F.2d at 835 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
178. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,017-19) (only 1 dentist out of the 100,000 practicing dentists has tested positive for HIV).
179. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,026) (there are 280,000 HBV infections annually).
180. See id. at 834 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1980) (the
cotton ginning industry was excluded from the airborne concentration of cotton dust
standard); 29 C.F.R. $ 1910.1043(a)(2) (1993). For further examples of OSHA excluding specific industry sectors from a rule, see Martin, 984 F.2d at 834 n.7.
181. Martin, 984 F.2d at 834 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added) (citing International Union, United Automobile Workers v.
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
182. AF'L-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 972 (11th Cir. 1992).
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certainly have been invalidated. The Eleventh Circuit's requirement that each rule must be able "to stand independently, . . .
supported by substantial evidence in the r e ~ o r d " ' ~
would
have required OSHA to disaggregate the health care industry
and then show that a si&icant risk existed in each sector.
Another failure of OSHA and the Martin court was their
erroneous finding that the new regulation reduced or eliminated the risk. The bloodborne-pathogen rule provided no new
significant benefits to employees while it did impose costs and
burdens on employers.
At the time of the rule's promulgation, the dental industry
was already operating under a number of CDC guidelines, state
agency and professional institution regulations, and voluntary
Given the standards
measures such as HBV va~cination.'~~
which dentists used to protect themselves from health hazards
and the admitted efficiency of the HBV vaccination, there is
little evidence upon which OSHA could rely to suggest that its
standards did anything more t o reduce the risk to workers.
Given the state of regulation prior t o rule promulgation, Judge
Coffey was justified in suggesting that "a 'rule is arbitrary and
capricious if the agency . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,'"ls5 and that this 'leads to but
one conclusion, that the final rule can and must be classified as
arbitrary and caprici~us."'~~

C. Feasibility
The final hurdle OSHA must overcome t o justify the imposition of a regulation is a showing that the standards are both .
technologically and economically feasible. Technological feasibility was not a contested issue in Martin, as many of the
OSHA regulations were being observed prior to promulgation of
the rule. Additionally, representatives of the dental industry do
not argue that the entire health care industry should be exempted from regulation. On the other hand, in AFL-CIO the
PEL standards were not found to be technologically feasible.
The facts concerning this issue were not disputed and do not
provide a useful forum for instructive contrast.
183. Id.
184. See Martin, 984 F.2d at 837.
185. Id. (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
186. Id. at 837-38 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Economic feasibility, on the other hand, is very much an
issue of contention. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that OSHA
failed to show that the PEL standard was economically feasible
for the same reasons it found a lack of technological feasibility
and s i g d k a n t risk; that the agency only determined "feasibility for each industry 'sector,' . . . without explaining why
such a broad grouping was appropriate."'" Continuing the
theme of examining each industry separately, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded: "Indeed, it would seem particularly important not to aggregate disparate industries when making a
Although this analysis is
showing of economic fea~ibility."'~~
correct and was applicable to the case before the court, the
opinion fails t o provide a useful application of the Supreme
Court's guiding principles concerning economic feasibility. The
illustrative concepts and implications of the economic feasibility
issue present themselves in an examination of the Martin decision. However, the proper model is not exemplified by what the
Seventh Circuit did; rather, it is suggested by what it failed to
do.
The Martin majority held that the standard was economically feasible despite the fact that the bloodborne-pathogen
standard failed the cost-benefit test, the cost-effectiveness test,
and the economic efficiency test. In lone dissent, Judge Coffey
recognized that "[tlhe rule unduly burden[ed] health care employers, including but not limited t o dentists, doctors and hospitals."'"
It is surprising that this majority, Judges Posner and
Easterbrook, upheld the regulation utilizing such faulty economic analysis. Judges Posner and Easterbrook "are both properly recognized and respected as experts in the field of economics as well as law."lgoPosner, who wrote for the majority, is
the author of Economic Analysis of Law, in which he states:
"This book is written in the conviction that economics is a powe r N tool for analyzing a vast range of legal question^."'^^
Posner correctly maintained that OSHA "did not (indeed is
not authorized to) compare the benefits with the costs" of a

187. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 982 (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Martin, 984 F.2d at 831-32 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
190. Id. at 838 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
A. POSNER,ECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF LAW 3 (3d ed. 1986).
191. RICHARD
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regulation.lg2 Rather, his economic analysis only examined
"whether the restrictions would . . . imperil[] the existence of,
or threaten[] massive dislocation to, the health care industry."lg3Posner was probably correct in asserting that the added $813 million a year in costs imposed by the regulations will
not bankrupt the U.S. health care industry.lg4However, the
health care system and its accompanying insurance systems
"are struggling and almost bankrupt partially because of excessive and unnecessary regulations . . . ."lg5 Although the existence of the health care industry may not be a t risk, further
OSHA regulations which exacerbate the health care crisis may
do more harm than good.
If the reviewing court were allowed to engage in cost-benefit analysis, the rule would not survive the scrutiny of judicial
review. The benefits realized from the bloodborne-pathogens
rule are relatively small. As discussed above, the rule does not
secure significant benefits for health care workers. Given the
previous state of regulation and voluntary vaccination, very
little is gained by the OSHA regulation. Even accepting
OSHA's estimated value of human life (about $4 m i l l i ~ n ) ' ~
multiplied by the one confirmed case of AIDS in a dental worker and the uncertain estimate of HBV fatalities, the benefits
are sigdiicantly outweighed by the costs imposed by the standards. If required, the OSHA regulations would not pass an
economic cost-benefit analysis.
Despite the fact that OSHA is not compelled t o engage in
cost-benefit analysis, "the Supreme Court has recommended
that OSHA . . . consider drafting the less costly of two equally
effective proposal^."^^' Given the Supreme Court's statements
in the Cotton Dust case,lg8it is reasonable t o expect a reviewing court to require OSHA t o pass a cost effectiveness test.
In addition to the universal precautions based bloodbornepathogens rule promulgated by OSHA, there is another alter-

192. Martin, 984 F.2d at 825.
193. Id. at 825 (citing 29 U.S.C. 8 655(b)(5) (1988); Benzene, 448 U.S. 607,
642-45, 655-56 (1980) (plurality opinion); Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 509-12, 530-36
(1981)).
194. See id. at 825 (stating that costs of $813 million per year are "clearly not
enough to break the multi-hundred-billiondollar health care industry").
195. Id. at 838 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Id. at 825.
197. Id. at 838 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S.490, 513 n.32 (1981).
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native which would be substantially equal in effectively reducing whatever risk exists to health care workers. Even OSHA
has admitted that "[tlhe risk of HBV infection is most efficiently and dramatically reduced by vaccinating all workers exposed
t o blood and other potentially infectious material^."'^^
Coffey's dissent magnified the faltering of the agency's policy
when he noted that, "For reasons unknown and contrary to
sound medical judgment and research, OSHA concluded that
even though vaccinations would reduce almost all risk of health
care professionals becoming infected by HBV, the additional far
more expansive, impractical and cost inefficient precautions
were necessary."200
Although some may note that there are individuals who
will refuse t o be vaccinated,zO'this is not a compelling argument. OSHA has authority to adopt a mandatory vaccination
program.202When viable alternatives are available to OSHA,
it should not be allowed to adopt rules whose benefits could be
achieved through far more efficient and reasonable means.
Finally, adoption of these standards creates economic inefficiency and violates sound judicial discretion. At this time of
reform, unwarranted and repetitious regulation will create
false signals in the health care market. Regulations which
impose costs will cause demand for health care to diminish. As
these costs increase, providers will either pass them on t o consumers or will be forced to bear them through a reduction of
profits. Innocent third parties will be adversely impacted by the
regulations, as costs are passed on to consumers, resulting in a
decrease of the amount of health care demanded. Although
such a decrease in the dental, industry will rarely have fatal
results, it will result in a general deterioration of dental health
and an increase in general suffering.
Chief Judge Stephen Breye?03 has written:

199. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,036 (1991).
200. Martin, 984 F.2d at 839 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis omitted) (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,036-38 (1991)).
201. Id. at 825.
202. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that vaccination can be required despite objections on the grounds of religion and privacy); see
also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
319-20 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 147-54 (1973); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
203. Stephen G. Breyer is the Chief Judge of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
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The development of voluntary standards by industry
groups creates little risk of harm to the firm through error,
for their voluntariness allows individual firms to reject the
standards if they are absurd, inappropriate, or simply wrong.
When a "should" in such a standard is changed to a "must,"
however, the risk of harm increases.204

It is surprising to the informed observer to find Judge Breyer
making an argument promoting economic efficiency and to find
the economically conservative Judge Posner in the opposite
camp.
One of the sharpest critics of OSHA regulations on the
basis that they are economically inefficient is Judge Posner
himself.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, which directs
the establishment of minimum federal standards of worker
safety and health, is a particularly ambitious example of
worker protection legislation. Is i t necessary? The employer
has a selfish interest in providing the optimal level of worker
health and safety . . . . Legislation prescribing the health and
safety conditions of employment may raise the level of health
and safety beyond the level desired by the employees and the
employers . . . ?05

After noting the only winners with OSHA regulations are labor
unions, he concludes:
Properly administered (an enormous qualification),
OSHA might, therefore, simply raise the level of occupational
safety and health to the level a t which it would be but for the
public subsidy of workers' injuries and illnesses. The problem,
however, with using one government intervention in the marketplace . . . to justify another . . . is that it invites an indefinite and unwarranted expansion in government. A series of
incremental steps each of which makes economic sense in
light of the previous steps may, looked a t a s a whole, make no

economic sense at

Regardless of which test is utilized, the OSHA bloodbornepathogens rule is not economically feasible. Additionally, the
inefficient government regulation imposes unnecessary costs
204. BREYER,supra note 38, at 102.
205. POSNER,
supra note 191, at 311.
206. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
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upon the dental care consumer, reduces the number of individuals employed in the industry, and confers negligible benefits
upon health care workers. Ultimately, no one is protected by or
benefits from the rule.

Proper judicial review is the only procedural safeguard
established by Congress to check excessive regulation by
OSHA. When a circuit court of appeals correctly applies the
guiding principles established by the Supreme Court and fulfdls its reviewing role, it promotes administrative fidelity t o
congressional intent. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin and
AFL-CIO v. OSHA are excellent examples of the divergent roles
courts of appeals have elected t o play in this process of judicial
review of OSHA regulation.
The rules and applications of law forwarded by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in ML-CIO are more jurisprudentially correct than the hands-off approach taken by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Martin. Judicial review of
OSHA regulations as applied in Martin takes a step backwards. Its results prove catastrophic to an employer's ability to
meaningfully challenge onerous and burdensome regulations.
Rather than forcing OSHA to remain within the confines of its
authority as conferred by Congress, this decision exhibited a
tendency by courts to adopt a deferential attitude towards
regulatory agencies. Under such a system, the only remaining
escape from inefficient regulation is a showing that the rule is
so burdensome that it imperils the very existence of the entire
industry.
Given the current conflict of rulings among the circuits, the
United States Supreme Court ought to grant certiorari in the
future in an appropriate case, with the purpose of clarifying
this area of law. In the event that the Court does rule on a
such a case, they would be well advised to follow the Eleventh
Circuit's ML-CIO lead by establishing the "harder look" standard of review, requiring OSHA to show with reasonable certainty that a sigmficant risk of material health impairment
exists, and compelling OSHA to use the cost-effectiveness test.
Sound economic reasoning argues that any governmental
regulation is inefficient and that self-interested employers will
voluntarily impose upon themselves the optimal amount of
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safety standards as the most efficient form of reg~lation.~~'
However, it is a political and social reality that Congress has
placed a higher value upon an over-regulated workplace in
favor of worker protection at the cost of economic efficiency.
Consequently, this proposed standard strikes the optimal balance between the desire to assure "safe and healthful working
conditions"208and the need to sufficiently protect employers
from "arbitrary and capricious" OSHA regulations.
The race to the courthouse, in the OSHA context, has developed because of a divergence of views amongst the circuits
regarding their review responsibilities. Although the Supreme
Court has set forth principles for the substantive content of
OSHA standards, these differences in approach may in reality
go beyond the question of the formal rule of law to be applied.
Rather, it may focus on a far broader question of whether the
court is sympathetic to the agency's regulatory goals and the
social politics of the thing being regulatec12" However, until
the Supreme Court resolves the conflict and so long as the
parties perceive that certain courts of appeals are more (or
less) sympathetic t o the agency's regulatory efforts, the race
will surely continue.

David R. Cherrington
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